The regulation of alcohol availability has the potential to influence worker productivity. In particular, opening hours of bars could affect worker effort through the proximity of leisure consumption to working hours and the timing of alcohol consumption could spill over into working hours. This paper uses legislative changes in bar opening hours to provide a potential quasi-natural experiment of the effect of alcohol availability on working effort, focusing on worker absenteeism. This paper examines two recent policy changes, one in England/Wales and one in Spain that increased and decreased opening hours, respectively. A robust positive causal link is demonstrated between opening hours and absenteeism. We provide evidence which suggests that alcohol consumption is a key mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
The regulation of alcohol consumption remains a highly contentious area of public policy and has generated a large literature in both public health and economics (see Anderson et al, 2009 and Carpenter and Dobkin, 2011a for recent reviews). Policies aimed at regulating alcohol are numerous including taxation, minimum pricing, age based restrictions, place-based restrictions and restrictions on the timing of sales. Timing restrictions can take many forms, including restrictions on permissible days and hours of alcohol availability both on and off premises. For instance, day restrictions include laws that prevent Sunday sales of alcohol in the United States (the so called 'Blue Laws') and Australia and Saturday sales in Scandinavia (Gronqvist and Niknami, 2011; Heaton, 2012) . These appear to influence consumption behavior. For instance, Carpenter and Eisenberg (2009) show that allowing Sunday sales in Ontario, Canada, increased Sunday-specific drinking by 7-15%. At the same time, restrictions of the timing of on premise drinking are the norm, but with large variations in actual opening hours across jurisdictions. The aim of these laws is not solely to restrict alcohol availability, but also to reduce negative externalities from leisure behavior such as noise pollution and disruption to residents near venues. This regulation of opening hours has been shown to influence a range of health and socio-economic outcomes including alcohol consumption (Bernheim, Meer and Novarro 2012) , traffic accidents (Vingilis et al., 2005; Smith 1990 ) and crime (Carpenter and Dobkin, 2011b; Chikritzhs and Stockwell 2002; Biderman et al., 2010; Hough and Hunter, 2008 and Humphreys and Eisner 2010) .
Whilst aimed primarily at reducing social externalities associated with excessive consumption, alcohol regulations also have the potential to influence labor market outcomes.
In terms of taxation, this idea has attracted some attention. For instance, Johansson et al (2012) examine the effect of a cut in alcohol taxation in Finland which led to large differences in alcohol prices from Sweden. They show that this had a weak effect on mortality and alcohol related illnesses but substantially increased workplace absenteeism, a 5% increase for males and a 13% increase for females in Swedish regions near the Finnish border when compared to those Swedish regions that are over 100 km away from the border.
In contrast, Dave and Kaestner (2002) find no evidence that alcohol taxes are related to labor market outcomes such as employment, hours of work and wages in the US.
Timing restrictions have the clear potential to markedly influence workers' leisurelabor decisions, but this has received little attention to date. Traditionally, how government regulation influences leisure decisions is thought of through the lens of income and 3 substitution effects. Thus, there is a large body of research on the incentive effects of taxation and how hours of work are affected by taxes and transfers (see for instance Burtless and Hausman, 1978; Blundell, Meghir, Symons and Walker, 1988; Blomquist et al., 1990; Bourguignon et al., 1990; Heckman, 1993; Blundell, Duncan and Meghir, 1998) . However, individual labor supply behavior could be influenced directly by leisure regulation if, for instance, it affects the timing proximity of leisure consumption and working hours (Biddle and Hamermesh, 1990 ). In the case where it involves intoxicating substances, like alcohol, the timing of consumption could also have spill-over effects into working hours. For instance, existing research shows a general link between alcohol consumption and absenteeism (Balsa and French, 2010; Johansson et al, 2008; Norstrom, 2006; and Norstrom and Moan, 2009) This paper investigates how the regulation of licensed hours at establishments that serve alcohol influences working hours, focusing primarily on worker absenteeism. While, there is no existing evidence along these lines, it has been previously suggested that other forms of alcohol legislation such as minimum drinking ages and reductions in alcohol taxation can influence workforce productivity (Carpenter and Dobkin, 2011a; Johannson et al, 2012) . We use recent changes in legal pub and club (herein bars for simplicity) opening hours in the UK and Spain as 'quasi-natural' experiments to identify the effect of on-premises alcohol availability on absence, which provides a readily measurable proxy for worker effort (Audas et al, 2004) . These two legislative changes provide a nice point of comparison, as one involves a substantial liberalization of opening hours (the UK) while the other involves a similarly substantial decrease in opening hours (Spain). These changes have the potential to affect working behavior due to the proximity of leisure activity to normal working hours, but also through the timing of the consumption of alcohol.
To summarize our results, we demonstrate a causal link between bar opening hours and worker absenteeism, longer opening hours increase absence. In terms of the direction of the effects, the results are symmetric for the UK and Spain: increasing opening hours (UK) increases absenteeism, decreasing opening hours (Spain) reduces absenteeism. These results are robust across a range of specifications and differing identification strategies within both countries. For instance, while we can identify the causal effect using difference in difference approaches, we also identify the policy effect within a triple difference set-up for Spain and incorporate worker fixed effects in the UK. In addition, we demonstrate the robustness of our results to common sources of bias in the estimates derived from applying a difference-indifference methodology such as appropriate control groups and violations in the common trend assumption. Our data is also advantageous insofar as its relatively long time dimension 4 allows us to address standard concerns regarding inference in difference in difference models.
Finally, we provide evidence on the mechanisms through which the policy influenced worker absenteeism for the UK. This evidence is suggestive of a central role for increased alcohol consumption on premises.
II. DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

Changes in Drinking Laws, UK and Spain
The identification strategy in this paper is based on two legislative changes; an extension of legal closing hours in two parts of the UK, England and Wales and a reduction in the permitted hours that bars could remain open in Spain. For England and Wales, prior to the legislative change pubs were not allowed to stay open (and serve alcohol) after 11:00 pm. Hence, the main expansion occurred in the initial time period that the legislation was enacted.
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In the Spanish case, the reduction in opening hours consisted of a requirement that licensed venues, such as bars, were legally required to close at 3:00 am (with some minor variation noted below). Prior to the legislative change the legal closing time was 6 am, and the majority of drinking venues did not close until this time. This legislation was enacted in different periods regionally across Spain, and varied in terms of the actual new time of closing ranging from 2:00 am to 3:30 am. The differential timing of the reform in Spain reflects the devolution of certain legislative powers to regional levels. In the case of public entertainment and recreation policy, devolution was completed by 1996. This meant that whilst the key legislative change in opening hours was mandated at a federal level, a degree of regional autonomy in the timing of the adoption and actual closing times was permitted.
We investigate the potential for bias of our results from non-random timing of adoption later.
Importantly, other related policies, such as alcohol taxation and prices, age based regulation, location restrictions and drink driving policies and sanctions are enacted only at a national 1 We investigate the sensitivity of our results to the timing of implementation along with regional variations in the extent of expansion.
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level. This limits the potential of our policy estimates to be influenced by confounding changes in other related alcohol policy. Specifics of the actual legislative changes are reported in Table 1 . Column 2 of Table 1 shows the quarter and year the reform came into force in Spain in each of the regions (reported in column 1).
INSERT years report `going out for a drink' at least once a week, this drops to 34 for those aged 25 to 34 years, but stays remarkably high after that; 25% of those aged 35-64 report going out for a drink at least once a week, with the same percentage for those aged 65 or more. In contrast, bar attendance is heavily concentrated among young people in Spain (Calafat et al., 2002 6am. Together this suggests that the policy will be binding for young people. These differences in the demographics of bar attendance help to inform our country specific identification strategies later.
It is also worth noting that the stated reasons for these two legislative changes were markedly different. In the UK, it reflected a view that the prior regime of an 11pm closing time was needlessly restrictive and that shorter opening hours may encourage binge drinking insofar as individuals would increase the speed of alcohol consumption (IAS, 2007) . While in Spain, it primarily reflected concerns over noise pollution and general disruption to residents near licensed venues. Finally, the margin at which these changes occurred means that the policy changes are likely to affect different types of individuals in the UK and Spain.
Extending hours from 11pm is likely to hit a broad cross-section of individuals. In contrast,
reductions from 6am to 3am are more likely to be binding for younger individuals: they are simply more likely to attend bars at these times.
Data
This paper uses two data sets that are very similar in their basic structure, the UK Longitudinal Labor Force Survey (UK LFS) and the Spanish Labor Force Survey (SLFS).
Both are quarterly representative surveys that provide a range of information on individual and work characteristics. A key feature of the data for our purposes is that they both have an internationally consistent definition of absence (Barmby, Ercolani and Treble, 2002 estimates are robust to using these narrower definitions of absence. This is discussed in more detail in the results section. Finally, our measures of absence may be affected by changes in contractual hours caused by the policy. In unreported estimates we found no effect of the policy change on contractual hours in either England/Wales or Spain. We also found no effect of the policy on the probability of being employed.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Figures 1 and 2 provide some illustrative information on the changes in the dependent variables with respect to the policy change. Specifically they show absence trends before and after the policy changes. These are presented in Figure 1 for England/Wales and Scotland/Northern Ireland, respectively. Both panels of Figure 1 provide some indication that the absence trends for England/Wales and Scotland/Northern Ireland follow the same pattern prior to the policy change. After the policy there is a clear divergence in behavior; workers in England/Wales take relatively more absence, while for Scotland/Northern Ireland the trend appears stable.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Figure 2 plots similar data for Spain. An added complication here is that we have variation in the timing of policy implementation by region. We show two sets of plots. The first, shows raw data plotting our absence measures for treatment regions prior to the policy change and a 'control' series that consists of regions that never implemented the policy in our sample period. What is apparent is that these series are very similar in both trends and levels. 3 We consider usual hours as synonymous of contractual hours. This is similar in spirit to the approach used in previous research by Barmby et al (2002) , Lozano (2010) and Green and Navarro (2012) , among others.
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For the second set of plots, shown in Figure 3 , we normalise the period of implementation to zero for all treated regions and plot the average absenteeism across pre and post-policy periods (12 quarters before and after). We then fit a regression in the spirit of a regression discontinuity design. While there is a lot of variance in the average absence behavior, these show a clear decrease in absence behavior post policy implementation in the treated regions.
INSERT FIGURE 3
Both data sets have quite a rich set of potential control variables, including many of the candidates that have been shown to be important determinant's of worker absenteeism in previous research. Thus, we incorporate socio-demographic variables, including the age and the age squared, gender, marital status, education level. We also include labor variables which denote whether the individual works in the public sector, the type of contract, industry dummies, occupation dummies and size of the firm/establishment. We also introduce year and quarter dummies to take account of seasonal and time variations.
An important issue is that certain individuals' working hours may be directly affected by the change in drinking laws, most notably those who work in bars. We exclude all individuals working in these establishments, and to be especially sure, those working in allied industries such as hotels and restaurants. 4 Finally, workers on part time work may have more natural variability in their working hours. For this reason, we investigate the robustness of our results to excluding part time workers. Appendix Table A1 provides summary statistics for the resultant samples for both Spain and the UK.
III. METHODOLOGY AND IDENTIFICATION
The differences in the nature of the legislation, data and institutional factors lead to variations in the identification strategy we adopt for England/Wales and Spain.
For England and Wales we construct a simple difference-in-difference model that relies upon the comparison of workers in England and Wales to those in Scotland and
Northern Ireland where there was no change in drinking laws. This leads to the following reduced form model of the effect of licensing laws on absenteeism:
where ijt A corresponds to the minutes of absence of worker i in region j in period t. (1) is equivalent to the Differences-in-Differences (DD) estimator and this provides an estimate of the increase in absence caused by the change in licensing laws for workers in England or Wales compared to those living in Scotland or Northern
Ireland. Along with a range of robustness tests reported later, we also exploit the longitudinal nature of the data for the UK to extend (1) and include worker level fixed effects. Because we can observe the week of interview in the UK-LFS we can identify this policy effect separately from quarter controls aimed to pick up seasonality in absence.
For Spain, we have regional and time variation in the adoption of the legislative change. We observe 11 regions (out of 18 in total) changing drinking hours in different periods. As a result, we specify the following estimating equation:
where ijt A corresponds to the minutes of absence of worker i, in region j in period t.
ijt Policy takes the value 1 if the worker is observed in region j and at time t that region has reduced drinking hours and  is equivalent to the Differences-in-Differences (DD) estimator and we again include a vector of regional and year fixed effects. As differences in absence trends pre-policy may be confounded with the policy effect we introduce region-year interactions to allow for different trends across regions. We estimate equation (2) for all workers, and also split by age groups (18-30, 31-45 and 46 and older).
As may have been expected from the earlier discussion we find marked age variation for Spain: the policy effect is completely contained in 18-30 year old workers. This age variation allows us to extend (2) to a triple difference model such that:
Young is a dummy variable that equals one if the worker is 30 years or younger, and 0 if the worker is older. 5 The interaction term ijt ijt Young Policy  equals one for treated individuals in the post-treatment period (after the legislation came into force in the region of the individual's residence). Estimates of  are equivalent to the Difference-in-Differences-inDifferences (DDD) estimator and this provides the absence caused by the reform for young workers (i.e. the reduction in absenteeism for young workers in treated regions caused by shutting bars and pubs earlier). This includes region specific time trends, treatment (young) specific time trends and, in addition, region treatment interactions.
A standard concern in the literature on policy evaluation using difference in difference approaches is that spurious inference may result if the error structure is not modelled correctly. Specifically, a concern in our case would be the assumption that the error term is normally distributed within the regions in which our workers are embedded. This may lead to standard errors which are artificially low. One approach is to introduce robust standard errors clustered at the regional level. However, in both the UK and Spain we observe relatively few regions, 20 regions for the UK and 18 for Spain. This is even more problematic for the UK as the policy only varies at the country level. Standard results for the introduction of clustered standard errors with small numbers of groups are not encouraging (Bertrand et al., 2004) . As an alternative we adopt the approach suggested by Cameron et al., (2008) and estimate our standard errors using a wild bootstrap procedure by cluster (regions) that aims to address this issue. A related concern is that while using longer panels of data help to address concerns regarding spurious estimates in DD models, the presence of serial correlation in the dependent variable will downwardly bias standard errors. In additional robustness checks we also adopt the approach suggested by Bertrand et al (2004) and collapse our data into pre and post policy periods and re-estimate our models weighted by cell size.
Finally, in all models we estimate variants of (1), (2) and (3) where the dependent variable is the absence rate (AR) as defined above. 6 This dependent variable is more flexible insofar as it explicitly allows for variations in contractual hours. 5 We stress that our results are robust to other controls groups such as workers older than 45 years old. As might be expected these models provided slightly larger point estimates of the policy effect.
INSERT absence by approximately 3% and lead to an increase in time lost through absence of 15 minutes per week per worker. All standard errors throughout the paper are calculated using the Wild Bootstrap with assignment at the regional cluster level (see Cameron et al, 2008) . In the bootstrap procedure we use the Rademarcher distribution and set the number of replications to 400.
INSERT TABLE 3
In Table 3 we extend this model by utilising the panel dimension of the UK LFS to include worker level fixed effects. We restrict our sample of workers to the period 2004 to 2008 as due to the relatively short panel component of the UK LFS we only observe certain subset of workers in both pre and post-treatment periods. The resultant estimates again show that the extension of drinking hours substantially affects worker absence behavior. For instance, the policy effect on minutes of absence is slightly larger than that reported earlier estimation 26 versus 15. The effect on the absenteeism rate is less marked, it falls from approximately 3% to 1.7%, but still remain statistically significant at standard levels. This suggests that these earlier results were not driven entirely by, for instance, some compositional change in the unobservable characteristics of workers pre-and-post reform. In unreported estimates we also investigated whether there was a within-worker change in absenteeism in Scotland and
Northern Ireland at the time of the policy introduction as a form of placebo policy test. The 7 We also estimated the absence rate models by OLS, the sign and significance of our estimates were unaffected by this.
8 It is worth noting that in both the Spanish and UK cases the estimates on the control variables largely follow those previously reported in the literature on absence. For instance, temporary workers take less absence (Bradley, Green and Leeves, 2012, Ichino and Riphahn, 2005) , public sector workers take more absence and female and married workers take more absence (Barmby, Orme and Treble, 1991) .
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resultant fixed effects estimate of the placebo policy effect whilst positive was far from statistical significant at standard levels (9. Our results suggest that shorter drinking hours reduced absenteeism, however the estimates are not statistically significant at standard levels. Following the earlier discussion and the margin at which the hours reduction occurred (i.e. from 6am) we suspect that any effect on absenteeism may be more concentrated amongst younger workers. As a result, we reestimated our models for three groups of workers; those aged 18 to 30 years, 31 to 45 year and those aged 46 years or older. The estimates of these models, reported in table 4, reveal a marked age pattern underlying the pooled estimates. The effect of the policy on absenteeism is concentrated entirely among young workers who took roughly 10 minutes less absence a week on average and had a 2.6% lower absenteeism rate as a result of the reduction in opening hours. There is effectively no policy effect for older worker groups. In unreported estimates, similar age heterogeneity models for England and Wales revealed little difference in the impact of the extension of hours.
INSERT TABLE 5
With this age pattern in mind we further extend our approach for Spain and use the group of workers aged more than 31 as a further control group. This assumes that the young are more heavily treated as their behavior is particularly likely to be influenced by the later closing hours. Thus, we compare the influence of the treatment not only on the treated and control but on the young and not young within each of those groups. On this basis, we re-estimate a triple difference model as per (3) and these results are reported in 
INSERT TABLE 6
Our current estimates include all workers irrespective of working hours. A concern is that part-time workers have hours of work that naturally vary and this may somehow bias our policy estimates. Table 6 provide estimates for full-time workers only. In all cases the difference between these estimates and those reported earlier are at most modest. This suggests that our results are not being driven by workers with more variable hours changing their working patterns due to the change in opening hours. Moreover, in further unreported estimates we used our proxy for contractual hours (usual hours) as a dependent variable in our difference in difference and triple difference models. In no case did we detect a policy effect on contractual hours. This suggests our results are not the artifact of a change in underlying contractual hours contemporaneous with the policy changes.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Our results demonstrate that drinking law regulations have the potential to influence an individual's intra-marginal labor supply decisions. A strength of our approach is that the effect is found for two different countries where the policy was operating in different directions, and moreover, where different identification strategies are used. Nonetheless, in this section we conduct a range of other robustness checks on our main estimates.
INSERT TABLE 7
The key identifying assumption for any DD strategy is that the outcome in treatment and control group would follow the same trend in the absence of treatment. At first glance, the pre-treatment trends displayed for the UK in Figure 1 appear similar. In the estimates to this point we have included a vector of regional dummies, that control for mean differences in absenteeism across regions, and year dummies, that control for absence growth common to all regions. We extend this further by re-estimating our main models with linear time trends, region controls and region specific time trends. This is done with both yearly and quarterly linear time trends. The resultant estimates are reported in panel A of Table 7 . Our UK estimates appear robust to controlling for violations in the common trend assumption. We adopt a similar approach for Spain. Our previous estimates for Spain included yearly dummies, regional dummies and region specific year dummies. We extend this by instead 14 including linear time trends, region controls and region specific time trends; successively at a year and quarterly level. Our estimates seem generally robust. More pointedly, it suggests that our previous estimates for Spain were biased towards zero. Consider the estimates with quarterly time trends and quarterly region trend interactions. Unlike earlier, we find a statistically significant policy effect for all age groups, one that is larger than in previous tables.
A further concern relates to whether Scotland and Northern Ireland provide a good counter-factual for absence behavior in England and Wales. Figure 1 suggests that the levels of absence are, on average, quite similar pre-treatment between these areas. Nonetheless we investigated this further using a synthetic control method in the spirit of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003 As mentioned earlier, our measures of absenteeism may be too broad insofar as they capture all variations in working time, including those that occur for reasons out of the control of workers. To examine this we used information in the SLFS and UK LFS on reasons for variation of working hours to exclude categories that were less likely to be in the control of workers and hence, be affected by the policy. Specifically, we excluded those workers whose hours `usually vary' along with absence due to changing or loss of job, undertaking training, and union representation, strike or labor conflict and technical partial stop or employment regulation within a firm because of financial problems. This does change the tenor of our estimated policy effects. For Spain, the policy estimates are essentially unchanged. For the UK there is some increase in the estimated effect of the policy change.
For instance, UK minutes of absence due to the reform increases to 18.59 (from 14.08) and the absence rate is 10% (from 3%) in the difference-in-difference models.
INSERT TABLE 8 dimension is that if there is serial correlation in the dependent variable this leads to standard errors that are biased downwards and hence incorrect inference (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004) . To investigate this we collapse our data (by group characteristics in Spain and by individual in the UK) into two periods, pre and post reform. We then reestimate equations (1) and (2) on this collapsed data. For the case of Spain, the regressions are weighted by the number of observations in each cell to replicate the underlying micro data. The results are reported in Table 8 and demonstrate that the policy caused young worker's absence rate to decrease by 1% in Spain and an increase by 2.1% in worker's absence rate in the UK. Young workers reduce the minutes they are absent from work in Spain by 8 while workers in England and Wales increase the minutes they are absent from work due to increase in pub closing hours by 18 minutes. Importantly, these estimates remain statistically significant at standard levels and do not suggest that our previous policy inference was incorrect due to serial correlation in absenteeism.
INSERT TABLE 9
Could our results reflect either disruption associated with the implementation of the policy or some other form of short term effect? We attempt to address this by excluding the year of reform from our sample. In the case of Spain the excluded year varies by region due to the differential timing of reform. These estimates are reported in Table 9 for both countries (for Spain and the UK). These reveal that omitting the year of the reform does not change the main results. For instance, the estimated effect of the legislative change on the absence rate in Spain and the UK is not statistically different from those reported earlier. The same is true for the minutes difference models. We can use this type of approach to assess whether the policy continued to influence behavior in the years after implementation. These estimates reveal two things, the policy is not being identified by some form of disruption or other implementation effect, and by extension the policy continues to exert an influence on worker absence behavior at until, at least, one year after the reform year. This second point is important as it suggests that the policy has a lasting impact and individuals do not revert to pre-policy behavior after some period of adaptation. Finally, we re-estimated our main models with the reform lagged one year, this provides another form of placebo test. Estimates from these models revealed no effect of the lagged reform on absence behavior.
MECHANISMS
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To this point, we have demonstrated a robust relationship between bar closing hours and worker absenteeism. In practice, this effect could occur through a variety of channels.
For instance, the proximity of hours of leisure consumption and work could influence worker absence decisions. Likewise, increases in alcohol consumption or consumption more proximate to working hours could spill-over into working hours. In this section we provide some suggestive evidence for the UK that the effect of opening hours on absenteeism is related to alcohol consumption. Likewise, using the Health Survey for England (HSE) we can examine an indicator of heavy drinking. This representative data asks the question how many units of alcohol you consumed on your heaviest day of drinking in the last 7 days. We show the annual average of this for England as Figure 5 . Again, there is an indication of an increase in heavy drinking that coincides with the policy implementation. This is in line with the expenditure evidence.
INSERT TABLE 10
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) contains information on how often on average the interviewee goes out to licensed venues to drink. As the BHPS contains longitudinal data for England/Wales and Scotland and Northern Ireland we can use this information to estimate a DD model where frequency of going out to licensed venues is the dependent variable. Specifically, we construct the variable drink often which takes value 1 if the individual declares that they go out to licensed venues to drink several times a year, at least once a month and at least once a week and 0 if the individual goes out to license venues either once a year or less or never/almost never. These estimates suggest that extending bar hours increases the probability of going out for a drink in England and Wales by 1.2% compared to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Likewise we can use the expenditure information to estimate a simple analogue of our DD model for the UK with log alcohol expenditure per week (£) at licensed venues as the dependent variable. Extending bar hours increased alcohol expenditure on-premises by 6.8%
for individuals living in England and Wales compared to those living in Scotland and
Northern Ireland (Table 10 ). This provides evidence that greater on-premise availability increases alcohol expenditure. This is in line with previous evidence of the effect of offpremise availability on consumption provided by Carpenter and Eisenberg (2009) . Moreover, our estimates are broadly similar in magnitude to the 7%-15% found in their study of Sunday trading in Canada.
This information on expenditure also allows us to indirectly estimate the causal effect of alcohol consumption on premises on absenteeism that is due to longer opening hours. This is possible due to the UK LFS and the EFS sampling the same underlying population.
Specifically we are interested in estimating the effect of alcohol consumption on premises on absenteeism, using longer opening hours as a source of exogenous variation in on premise drinking such that:
Where the key parameter of interest is  , which provides the effect of alcohol expenditure on premise on absenteeism. This model is identified by an exclusion restriction, longer opening hours in England and Wales.
The main problem is the lack of expenditure information in the UK LFS and absence data in the EFS. This can be overcome by combining these two data sets, assuming that the sample moments are independent, and estimating a two samples two stage least squares model (Angrist and Krueger, 1992) such that:
absenteeism (6) using UK LFS data (Columns 2 and 3 from Table 7 ) where ijt A is the absence of individual i in region j at time t. Subsequently, we estimate the effect of extending bar hours on the logarithm of alcohol expenditure (7) as previously reported in Table 10 .
INSERT TABLE 11
The ratio of these two estimated coefficients  ˆˆ is identical to the 2SLS  coefficient in equation (4) for the exactly identified case where we have as many instruments (extended opening hours in England and Wales) as potential endogenous variables (log alcohol expenditure). This will give us a LATE estimate of alcohol consumption on absenteeism for those workers that are affected by the bar hours extension. Given that our estimate is a non linear combination of estimators we apply the delta method to compute the standard errors (Van Kippersluis et al., 2011 and Devereux and Hart, 2010) . The results are reported in Table   11 . These demonstrate very large and statistically significant effects of the alcohol consumption changes on absence for those affected by the policy. In fact, these effects, in the order of 3 hours more absence for a 1% increase in weekly alcohol expenditure on premises seem implausibly large. Nonetheless, they provide a further suggestion that a channel of transmission of the policy effect on absenteeism is through alcohol consumption.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper sought to examine how changes in permissible bar opening hours influences individual labor supply decisions. Specifically, we used two recent changes in the legal opening hours of licensed premises in Spain and England and Wales. These are particularly advantageous insofar as they provide policy changes in opposite directions, a reduction in drinking hours in Spain and an extension in England and Wales. Focusing on one dimension of intra-marginal labor supply, absenteeism, we demonstrate a causal effect of these legislative changes. Increasing opening hours in England and Wales increased worker absenteeism, whilst reducing opening hours in Spain reduced absenteeism. This result appears robust to a range of standard threats to identification. We provide further evidence that suggests that the channel of transmission is through an increase in alcohol consumption.
This result contributes to the growing literature on the labor market consequences of alcohol availability. It provides the first evidence, specifically, that more availability in terms 20 of the opening hours of licensed premises has an effect on worker absence behavior. In addition, we contribute to existing evidence that availability influences alcohol consumption.
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